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Contextual novelty changes reward representations in the
striatum
Abstract
Reward representation in ventral striatum is boosted by perceptual novelty, although the mechanism of
this effect remains elusive. Animal studies indicate a functional loop (Lisman and Grace, 2005) that
includes hippocampus, ventral striatum, and midbrain as being important in regulating salience
attribution within the context of novel stimuli. According to this model, reward responses in ventral
striatum or midbrain should be enhanced in the context of novelty even if reward and novelty constitute
unrelated, independent events. Using fMRI, we show that trials with reward-predictive cues and
subsequent outcomes elicit higher responses in the striatum if preceded by an unrelated novel picture,
indicating that reward representation is enhanced in the context of novelty. Notably, this effect was
observed solely when reward occurrence, and hence reward-related salience, was low. These findings
support a view that contextual novelty enhances neural responses underlying reward representation in
the striatum and concur with the effects of novelty processing as predicted by the model of Lisman and
Grace (2005).
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Abstract 
 
Reward representation in ventral striatum is boosted by perceptual novelty, although 
the mechanism of this effect remains elusive. Animal studies indicate a functional 
loop (Lisman and Grace, 2005) that includes hippocampus, ventral striatum and 
midbrain as important in regulating salience attribution within the context of novel 
stimuli. According to this model, reward responses in the ventral striatum or the 
midbrain should be enhanced in the context of novelty even if reward and novelty 
constitute unrelated, independent events. Using fMRI we show that trials with reward-
predictive cues and subsequent outcomes elicit higher responses in the striatum if 
preceded by an unrelated novel picture indicating that reward representation is 
enhanced in the context of novelty. Notably, this effect was observed solely when 
reward occurrence, and hence reward-related salience, was low. These findings 
support a view that contextual novelty enhances neural responses underlying reward 
representation in the striatum and concurs with the effects of novelty processing as 
predicted by the model of Lisman and Grace (2005).  
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Introduction 
The basal ganglia, together with their dopaminergic afferents, provide a mechanism to 
learn about reward value of different behavioral options (Berridge and Robinson, 
2003; Frank et al., 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006). In line with this view, fMRI studies 
show that reward, and reward predictive cues, elicit brain activity in the striatum (e.g. 
(Delgado et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2000; O'Doherty et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 
2004) and midbrain (Aron et al., 2004; Wittmann et al., 2005). However, the midbrain 
dopaminergic system also responds to non-rewarding novel stimuli in monkeys 
(Ljungberg et al., 1992) and humans (Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006; Wittmann et al., 
2007). From a computational perspective it has been suggested that novelty itself may 
act as a motivational signal which boosts reward representation and drives exploration 
of an unknown, novel choice option (Kakade and Dayan, 2002).  
 
Although processing of novelty and reward share common neural mechanisms, the 
neural substrate that supports an interaction between novelty and reward remains 
poorly understood. Research in animals reveals that hippocampal novelty signals 
regulate the ability of dopamine neurons to show burst firing activity. Given that burst 
firing is the main dopaminergic response pattern coding for rewards, and possibly 
other salient events, there is good reason to suspect that hippocampal novelty signals 
have the potential to regulate reward processing and salience attribution (Lisman and 
Grace, 2005). Hippocampal novelty signals are conveyed to VTA through the 
subiculum, ventral striatum and ventral pallidum where they cause disinhibition of 
silent dopamine neurons to induce a mode of tonic activity  (Lisman and Grace, 2005; 
Grace and Bunney, 1983). Importantly, only tonically active but not silent dopamine 
neurons transfer into burst firing mode and show phasic responses (Floresco et al., 
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2003). In this way, hippocampal novelty signals have the potential to boost phasic 
dopamine signals and facilitate encoding of new information into long-term memory. 
 
Although recent research has shown that stimulus novelty enhances a striatal reward-
prediction error (Wittmann et al., 2008), this finding does not address a physiological 
hypothesis that contextual novelty exerts an enhancing effect upon subsequent reward 
signals (Lisman and Grace, 2005). Testing this requires to independently manipulate 
the level of novelty and reward such that novelty (and familiarity) acts as temporally 
extended contexts preceding rewards. We investigated the expression of striatal 
modulation of reward-processing in the context of novelty by presenting a novel 
stimulus preceding the presentation of cues that predict rewards. Furthermore, we 
manipulated both factors (novelty and reward) independently and this allowed 
distinguishing their neural representations. We presented subjects with one of three 
different fractal images which cued reward delivery with a given probability (no 
reward (p=0), low (p=0.4) and high reward probability (p=0.8)). In this way, our 
design also enabled us to investigate whether contextual novelty influences on reward 
responses were affected by the probability of reward occurrence. A probability 
dependent effect of novelty on reward-processing would provide a strong 
support for the prediction that novelty and reward-processing functionally 
interact. In contrast, an effect of novelty on reward-related brain activity that is 
independent of reward-probability and magnitude would indicate that novelty 
and reward share brain regions and produce additive neural activity without a 
functional interaction. 
 
Material and Methods 
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 Subjects: 16 adults participated in the experiment (9 female and 7 male; age range 19-
32 years; mean 23.8, SD = 3.84 years). All subjects were healthy, right-handed and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal acuity. None of the participants reported a history 
of neurological, psychiatric or medical disorders or any current medical problems. All 
experiments were run with each subject’s written informed consent and according to 
the local ethics clearance (University College London, UK). 
 
Experimental design and task. The task was divided in 3 phases. In phase 1, subjects 
were familiarized with a set of 10 images (5 indoor, 5 outdoor). Each image was 
presented 10 times for 1000ms with an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1750±500ms. 
Subjects indicated the indoor/outdoor status using their right index and middle finger. 
In phase 2, 3 fractal images were paired, under different probabilities (0, 0.4 and 0.8), 
with a monetary reward of 10 pence in a conditioning session. Each fractal image was 
presented 40 times. On each trial, one of 3 fractal images was presented on the screen 
for 750ms and subjects indicated the detection of the stimulus presentation with a 
button press. The probabilistic outcome (10 or 0 pence) was presented as a number on 
the screen 750ms later for another 750ms and subjects indicated whether they won 
any money or not using their index and middle finger. The inter-trial interval (ITI) 
was 1750±500ms. Finally, in a test phase (phase 3) the effect of contextual novelty on 
reward-related responses was determined in four eleven-minute sessions (Figure 1). 
Here, an image was presented for 1000ms and subjects indicated the indoor/outdoor 
status using their right index and middle fingers. Responses could be made while the 
scene picture and subsequent fractal image were displayed on the screen (1750 ms in 
total). The image was either from the familiarized set of pictures from phase 1 
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(referred to as ‘familiar images’) or from another set of pictures that had never been 
presented (referred to as ‘novel images’). In total 240 novel images were presented to 
each subject. Thereafter, one of the 3 fractal images from phase 2 (referred to as 
reward predictive cue) was presented for 750ms (here, subjects were instructed not to 
respond). As in the second phase, the probabilistic outcome (10 or 0 pence) was 
presented 750ms later for another 750ms and subjects indicated whether they won 
money or not using their index and middle finger. Responses could be made while the 
outcome was displayed on the screen and during the subsequent intertrial interval 
(2500±500 ms in total). The ITI was 1750±500ms. During each session, each fractal 
image was presented 20 times following a novel picture and 20 times following a 
familiar picture, resulting in 120 trials per session. The presentation order of the six 
trial types was fully randomized. All three experimental phases were performed inside 
the MRI scanner but BOLD data was only acquired during the test phase (phase 3). 
Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as correctly as possible and that 
they would be paid their earnings up to £20. Participants were told that 10 pence 
would be subtracted for each incorrect response – these trials were excluded from the 
analysis. Total earnings were displayed on the screen only at the end of the 4th block.  
 
All images were gray-scaled and normalized to a mean gray-value of 127 and a 
standard deviation of 75. None of the scenes depicted human beings or human body 
parts (including faces) in the foreground. Stimuli were projected onto the centre of a 
screen and the subjects watched them through a mirror system mounted on the head 
coil of the fMRI scanner.  
 
 6
fMRI data acquisition. fMRI was performed on a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra magnetic 
resonance scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) with echo planar imaging (EPI). In 
the functional session 48 T2*-weighted images per volume (covering whole head) 
with blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were obtained (matrix: 64 x 
64; 48 oblique axial slices per volume angled at -30° in the anteroposterior axis; 
spatial resolution: 3 x 3 x 3 mm; TR = 2880 ms; TE = 30 ms). The fMRI acquisition 
protocol was optimized to reduce susceptibility-induced BOLD sensitivity losses in 
inferior frontal and temporal lobe regions (Weiskopf et al., 2006). For each subject 
functional data was acquired in four scanning sessions containing 224 volumes per 
session. Six additional volumes at the beginning of each series were acquired to allow 
for steady state magnetization and were subsequently discarded. Anatomical images 
of each subject’s brain were collected using multi-echo 3D FLASH for mapping 
proton density (PD), T1 and magnetization transfer (MT) at 1mm3 resolution 
(Weiskopf and Helms, 2008) and by T1 weighted inversion recovery prepared EPI 
(IR-EPI) sequences (spatial resolution: 1 x 1 x 1 mm). Additionally, individual field 
maps were recorded using a double echo FLASH sequence (matrix size = 64 x 64; 64 
slices; spatial resolution = 3 x 3 x 3 mm; gap = 1 mm; short TE = 10 ms; long TE = 
12.46 ms; TR = 1020 ms) for distortion correction of the acquired EPI images 
(Weiskopf et al., 2006). Using the ‘FieldMap toolbox’ (Hutton et al., 2002) field maps 
were estimated from the phase difference between the images acquired at the short 
and long TE.  
 
fMRI data analysis. Pre-processing included realignment, unwarping using individual 
fieldmaps, spatial normalizing to the Montreal Neurology Institute (MNI) space and 
finally smoothing with a 4mm Gaussian kernel. The fMRI time series data were high-
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pass filtered (cutoff = 128 s) and whitened using an AR(1)-model. For each subject a 
statistical model was computed by applying a canonical hemodynamic response 
function (HRF) combined with time and dispersion derivatives (Friston et al., 1998).  
 
Our 2x3 factorial design included 6 conditions of interest which were modelled as 
separate regressors: familiar-image with reward-probability 0, familiar-image with 
reward-probability 0.4, familiar-image with reward-probability 0.8, novel-image with 
reward-probability 0, novel-image with reward-probability 0.4, novel-image with 
reward-probability 0.8. The temporal proximity of the reward-predictive cues (i.e. 
fractal image) and the reward outcome itself poses problems for the separation of 
BOLD signals arising from these two events. Therefore, we modeled each trial as a 
compound event, using a mini-boxcar that included the presentation of both the cue 
and the outcome. This technical limitation was not problematic for our factorial 
analysis which concentrated on the interaction between novelty and reward 
processing and co-occurrences of reward and novelty effects. Error trials were 
modeled as a regressor of no interest. To capture residual movement-related artifacts 
six covariates were included (the three rigid-body translation and three rotations 
resulting from realignment) as regressors of no interest. Regionally specific condition 
effects were tested by employing linear contrasts for each subject and each condition 
(first-level analysis). The resulting contrast images were entered into a second-level 
random-effects analysis. Here, the hemodynamic effects of each condition were 
assessed using a 2x3 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the factors ‘novelty’ (novel, 
familiar), and reward probability (0, 0.4, 0.8).  
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We focused our analysis on 3 anatomically defined regions of interest (striatum, 
midbrain, and hippocampus) where interactions between novelty and reward 
processing were hypothesized based on previous studies (Lisman and Grace, 2005; 
Wittmann et al., 2005; Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006).  For completeness, we also report 
whole brain results in the supplementary material. Both the striatum and hippocampus 
regions of interest (ROI’s) were defined based on the Pick Atlas toolbox (Maldjian et 
al., 2003; Maldjian et al., 2004). While the striatal ROI included the head of caudate, 
caudate body, and putamen, the hippocampal ROI excluded the amygdala and 
surrounding rhinal cortex. Finally, the SN/VTA ROI was manually defined, using the 
software MRIcro and the mean MT image for the group. On MT-images the SN/VTA 
can be distinguished from surrounding structures as a bright stripe (Bunzeck and 
Duzel, 2006). It should be noted that in primates reward responsive dopaminergic 
neurons are distributed across the SN/VTA complex and it is therefore appropriate to 
consider the activation of the entire SN/VTA complex rather than focusing on it 
subcompartments (Duzel et al., 2009). For this purpose, a resolution of 3mm3, as used 
in the present experiment, allows to sample 20-25 voxels of the SN/VTA complex, 
which has a volume of 350 to 400 mm3.  
 
 
Results 
Behaviorally, subjects showed high accuracy in task performance during the 
indoor/outdoor discrimination task (mean hit rate 97.1%, SD=2.8% for familiar 
pictures; mean hit rate 96.8%, SD=2.1% for novel pictures; t15=0.38, n.s.), as well as 
for the win/no win discrimination at the outcome time (mean hit rate 97.8%, 
SD=2.3% for win events; mean hit rate 97.7%, SD=2.2% for no win events; t15=0.03, 
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n.s.). Subjects discriminated indoor and outdoor status faster for familiar compared to 
novel images (mean reaction time (RT) RT=628.2 ms, SD=77.3ms for familiar 
pictures; mean RT=673.8 ms, SD=111 ms for novel pictures; t15=4.43, P=0.0005). 
There was no RT difference for the win/no win discrimination at the outcome time 
(mean RT=542ms, SD=82.2 ms for win trials; mean RT=551 ms, SD=69 ms for no 
win trials; t15=0.82, n.s.). Similarly, during conditioning there were no RT differences 
for the 3 different fractal images (0.8-probability: RT=370.1 ms, SD=79 ms; 0.4-
probability: RT=354.4, SD=73.8ms; 0-probability: RT=372.2ms, SD=79.3ms; 
F(1,12)=0.045, n.s.). The latter RT analysis excluded three subjects due to technical 
problems during data acquisition.  
 
In the analysis of the fMRI data, a 2x3 ANOVA with factors ‘novelty’ (novel, 
familiar) and reward probability (p=0, p=0.4, p=0.8) showed a main effect of novelty 
bilaterally in the hippocampus (Figure 2A) and right striatum, FDR-corrected for the 
search volume of the ROIs. A simple main effect of reward (‘p=0.8 > p=0’) was 
observed within the left SN/VTA complex (Figure 2B) and within bilateral striatum 
(Figure 2C). See Table 1 for all activated brain regions. 
 
We did not observe a novelty × reward probability interaction when correcting for 
multiple tests over the entire search volume of our ROI’s.  However, when 
performing a post hoc analysis (t-test) of the three peak voxels showing a main effect 
of reward in the striatum, we found (orthogonal) effects of novelty and its interaction 
with reward: one voxel also showed a main effect of novelty and a novelty × reward 
interaction, whereas another voxel also showed a main effect of novelty.  
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As shown in figure 2C (middle), in the first voxel ([8 10 0]; main effect of reward 
F(2,30)=8.12, P=0.002; main effect of novelty F(1,15)=7.03, P=0.02; novelty x 
reward interaction F(2,30)=3.29, P=0.05) this effect was driven by higher BOLD 
responses to trials with reward probability 0.4 and preceded by a novel picture (post-
hoc t-test: t(15)=3.48, P=0.003). In the second voxel (2C right) ([-10 14 2] main effect 
of reward F(2,30)=13.13, P<0.001; main effect of novelty F(1,15)=9.19, P=0.008; no 
significant interaction F(2,30)=1.85, n.s.) post-hoc t-tests again demonstrated that the 
main effect of novelty was driven by differences between novel and familiar images 
at the two low probabilities of reward delivery (t(15)=2.79, P=0.014; and t(15)=2.19, 
P=0.045, for probability p=0 and p=0.4, respectively), (see figure 2C). In contrast, the 
third voxel (2C left [-22 4 0] main effect of reward, F(2,30)=9.1, P=0.001) neither 
showed a main effect of novelty (F(1,15)=2.33, n.s.) nor an interaction (F(2,30)=1.54, 
n.s.).  
 
In the midbrain, the voxel with maximal reward-related responses ([-8 -14 -8], 
F(2,30)=12.19, P<0.001), also showed a trend towards a main effect of novelty 
(F(1,15)=4.18, P=0.059) in the absence of a significant interaction (F(2,30)=0.048, 
ns). 
 
Discussion 
Novel images of scenes enhanced striatal reward responses elicited by subsequent 
and unrelated rewarding events (predicting abstract cues and reward delivery). As 
expected, novel images also activated the hippocampus. These findings, for the first 
time to our knowledge, provide evidence for a physiological prediction that novelty 
related hippocampal activation should exert a contextually enhancing effect on 
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reward-processing in the ventral striatum (Lisman and Grace, 2005; Bunzeck and 
Duzel, 2006). 
 
Due to the properties of the BOLD signal, the temporal proximity of the reward-
predictive cue and outcome delivery prevented an estimation of the effects of novelty 
on these events separately. Rather we considered the cue-outcome sequence as a 
compound event and found that the effect of novelty on reward processing varied as a 
function of the probability of reward occurrence. An enhancement was observed 
solely when the probability of predicted reward was low (0 or 0.4) and was absent for 
high reward probability (0.8) (Figure 2C). It is important to note that this pattern of 
results cannot be explained by independent effects of novelty and reward in the same 
region. BOLD effects caused by two functionally distinct but spatially overlapping 
neural populations would be additive irrespective of reward probability and hence 
lead to a novelty effect also in the 0.8 probability condition. Therefore, these 
probability dependent effects of novelty on reward processing argue against the 
possibility that they reflect a contamination by BOLD responses elicited by novel 
stimuli themselves. Rather, the findings indicate that contextual novelty increased 
reward processing per se, albeit only in the low probability condition.  
 
As explained above, we could not disambiguate BOLD responses between reward 
anticipation (cues) and reward delivery (outcomes). Novelty may have selectively 
increased the processing of non-rewarding outcomes (no win trials). This would be 
consistent with the fact that we did not observe any significant novelty effect on trials 
with high reward probability because 80% of these trials resulted in reward being 
delivered. Alternatively, novelty may have influenced reward anticipation for cues 
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that predicted reward delivery with low probability (i.e. 0 and 0.4). In either case, 
contextual novelty enhanced brain representation for those events that were 
objectively less rewarding. Moreover, the lack of novelty modulation of reward 
signals in the high probability condition is unlikely to be due to a ceiling effect in 
reward processing. Previous work has shown that reward related responses in the 
human striatum are scaled adaptively in different contexts resulting in a signal that 
represents whether an outcome is favorable or unfavourable in a particular setting 
(Nieuwenhuis et al 2004). It can thus be expected that reward responses should also 
be capable of accommodating a novelty bonus under conditions of high reward 
probability. 
 
It is well-established that the primate brain learns about the value of different stimuli 
paired with reward in classical conditioning experiments as measured by increased 
anticipation of the outcome (e.g. increased licking). In the present experiment we 
measured reaction times during the conditioning phase but did not find differences 
across the different levels of predictive cue strengths. Considering the simplicity of 
the task and the speed at which subjects responded (<375ms for all conditions), this 
lack of a differential response may be due to a ceiling effect. Despite the lack of an 
objective behavioral measure for conditioning, the successful use of this cue type in 
previous studies (e.g. O’Doherty et al., 2003) suggests that subjects still formed an 
association between the cues and the different probabilities of reward delivery.  
 
In previous work, reward signals in the striatum have been linked to a variety of 
reward-related properties both in humans and non-human primates including 
probability (Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2008), magnitude (Knutson et al., 
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2005), uncertainty (Preuschoff et al., 2006) and action value (Samejima et al., 2005). 
This diversity of reward related variables expressed in the striatum fits well with its 
role as a limbic/sensorimotor interface with a critical role in the organization of goal-
directed behaviors (Wickens et al., 2007). Both the SN/VTA and the striatum, one of 
the major projection sites of the midbrain dopamine system, also respond to reward 
and reward predictive cues in classical conditioning paradigms (e.g. (Delgado et al., 
2000; Knutson et al., 2000; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Knutson et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 
2005; Wittmann et al., 2005; D'Ardenne et al., 2008). According to several 
computational perspectives, dopamine transmission originating in the SN/VTA 
teaches the striatum about the value of conditioned stimuli via a prediction error 
signal (Schultz et al., 1997).  
 
Although in classical conditioning studies reward and non-reward representations 
expressed in the striatum do not always have obvious behavioral consequences 
(O'Doherty et al., 2003; den Ouden et al., 2009), fMRI studies have systematically 
shown that changes in striatal BOLD activity correlates with prediction errors related 
to the value of choice options as characterized by computational models fit to 
behavioral data (O'Doherty et al., 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006). Striatal state-value 
representations not linked to an action may be related to signals of reward availability 
that are translated into preparatory responses, for example approach or invigorating 
effects as seen in pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) (Cardinal et al., 2002; Talmi 
et al., 2008). Our data suggest that novelty modulates such state-value representations 
by increasing the expectancy of reward or the response to non-rewarding outcomes. 
The consequence of this interaction between novelty and reward could be the 
generation of unconditioned preparatory responses. In the real world, such responses 
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would lead to enhanced approach when novelty is identified with a cue (Wittmann et 
al., 2008) or random exploration of the environment when novelty is detected but not 
associated with a specific cue as observed in the animal literature (Hooks and Kalivas, 
1994). This view is also consistent with influential computational models (Kakade 
and Dayan, 2002).  
 
One critical structure that is likely involved in the contextually enhanced reward 
responses in the striatum is the hippocampus. As in previous studies (Tulving et al., 
1996; Strange et al., 1999; Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006; Wittmann et al., 2007) we show 
that contextual novelty activated the hippocampus more strongly than familiarity. 
Given its strong (indirect) projections to the SN/VTA we suggest that this structure is 
the likely source for a novelty signal to the midbrain dopaminergic system (Lisman 
and Grace, 2005; Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006). The dopaminergic midbrain also 
receives input from other brain areas such as the prefrontal cortex that could also have 
conveyed novelty signals to it (Fields et al., 2007).  Given the evidence to date, 
however, we consider the hippocampus as the most likely candidate for driving a 
novelty-related disinhibition of midbrain dopamine neurons that would explain an 
amplification of striatal reward signals in the context of novelty. On the other hand, 
the probability dependent moderation of the contextual novelty effect, in turn, may 
have originated in the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Physiological studies show that 
increasing PFC drive to SN/VTA neurons enhances dopaminergic modulation of PFC 
regions only but not dopaminergic input to the ventral striatum (Margolis et al., 
2006). Through such a mechanism, PFC could regulate the probability dependent 
contextual effects of novelty on SN/VTA and ventral striatal reward-representation.  
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To conclude, the present results demonstrate that contextual novelty increases reward 
processing in the striatum in response to unrelated cues and outcomes. These findings 
are compatible with the predictions of a polysynaptic pathway model (Lisman and 
Grace, 2005) in which hippocampal novelty-signals provide a mechanism for the 
contextual regulation of salience attribution to unrelated events.  
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Figure and table legends: 
 
Table 1. fMRI results.  Details of fMRI activations within the hippocampus, the 
striatum, and the midbrain ROI. Contrasts include novel versus familiar (A) and high 
reward probability versus no reward (B). Data are thresholded at p < 0.05 FDR. 
 
Figure 1: Experimental design  
Trial time line of the test task used while fMRI data acquisition. Beforehand, subjects 
underwent a familiarization and a conditioning phase inside the scanner but fMRI 
data was not acquired.  
 
Figure 2: fMRI results  
 (A) Results of the contrast novel versus familiar in the hippocampus ROI, and 
parameter estimate at the peak voxel of the activated cluster displayed in the map.  
(B) Results of the contrast high reward probability (p=0.8) versus no reward (p=0) in 
the midbrain ROI, and parameter estimate at the peak voxel of the activated cluster 
displayed in the map.  
(C) Results of the contrast high reward probability versus no reward in the striatum 
ROI, and parameter estimate at the peak voxel of the three activated clusters 
displayed in the map. 
Data are thresholded at p < 0.05 FDR. Activations maps are superimposed to on a T1 
group template (A and C) and on a magnetization transfer (MT) group template.  
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Table 1: 
 
  Voxel size FDR t z x y z 
A Hippocampus 13 0.011 4.28 4.04 22 -14 -26 
   0.011 4.28 4.04 24 -20 -18 
  14 0.015 4.07 3.85 -24 -26 -10 
  10 0.017 3.98 3.78 -22 -18 -20 
 Striatum 49 0.002 5.16 4.76 16 10 -2 
  21 0.013 4.06 3.85 -6 10 0 
  18 0.015 3.93 3.73 -16 8 0 
  13 0.019 3.77 3.6 26 4 -2 
  25 0.022 3.6 3.45 10 16 -2 
  10 0.025 3.48 3.34 28 -6 0 
B Midbrain 6 0.003 4.42 4.16 -8 -14 -8 
 Striatum 53 0.002 5.26 4.83 -10 14 2 
   0.034 3.08 2.98 -10 6 6 
  55 0.008 4.4 4.14 -22 4 0 
   0.011 4 3.79 -24 10 -6 
  30 0.009 4.18 3.95 8 10 0 
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